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INTRODUCTION 
The absolute priority rule describes the basic order of payment in 
corporate bankruptcy: 1  secured creditors get paid first, unsecured 
creditors get paid next, and only then do shareholders get paid, if at all.2 
The rule has obtained a kind of unassailable, near scriptural status in the 
corporate reorganization literature.3 As one august group of scholars has 
bluntly argued, “a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve absolute 
priority.”4 Another concludes, “simple rules that honor absolute priority 
																																																																																																																																
* Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton 
Hall University School of Law. Helpful comments came from Jack Ayer, Douglas 
Baird, Matthew Bruckner, Oscar Couwenberg, Thomas Jackson, Melissa Jacoby, 
Richard Levin, Bruce Markell, and Charles Sullivan. The paper also benefited from the 
comments received at the National Business Law Scholars Conference at Seton Hall. 
 1. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate 
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1983). 
 2. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988). 
 3. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
439 (1992); Alan Schwartz, The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm’s Investment 
Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1994); David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect 
of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992). 
 4. Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
849, 852 (1994). 
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are likely the best response.”5 And two well-known authors recently 
wrote that the “Bankruptcy Code’s core principle is that distribution 
conforms to predetermined statutory and contractual priorities.”6 
The most strident statements of the absolute priority rule come 
from those who are not bankruptcy experts. For example, Jonathan 
Macey and a co-author recently declared that “[t]he bankruptcy process 
is meant to follow standard rules in which the proceeds of 
unencumbered assets are distributed to creditors according to a strict 
priority schedule, governed by the nature of each creditor’s claim.”7 A 
similar notion can be seen in many of Richard Epstein’s writings during 
the Chrysler bankruptcy case.8 
The affection for the rule comes from a simple argument.9 Namely, 
supporters argue that the rule reduces the cost of debt capital because 
lenders can properly calculate their expected return on any loan at the 
time the loan is made.10 If lenders know that they will have to share 
value upon insolvency, they will charge more for their loans up front.11 
																																																																																																																																
 5. Barry E. Adler, Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of 
Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1150 (1994). 
 6. Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-
Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L REV. 1235, 1243 (2013) (emphasis 
added). 
 7. Jonathan Macey & Logan Beirne, Stealing Fannie and Freddie 2 (2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (emphasis added). 
 8. Richard A. Epstein, The Deadly Sins of the Chrysler Bankruptcy, FORBES (May 
12, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/11/chrysler-bankruptcy-mortgag 
e-opinions-columnists-epstein.html [http://perma.cc/5GSZ-BQQA]. Todd Zywicki, a 
bankruptcy expert, makes similar points. See Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and the Rule of 
Law, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12421735683661309 
1.html [http://perma.cc/L43R-GWPP]. 
 9. The basic form of the argument dates to at least William H. Meckling, 
Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13, 21, 30-31. But hints of the argument can be found even 
earlier, for example in Carl B. Spaeth & Gordon W. Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 
77, 32 ILL. L. REV. 769, 777 (1938), where the authors argue that “Congress certainly 
intended to place the debtor railroads, that is, the corporations, on a sound financial 
basis; concessions to the shareholders will defeat that purpose by weakening the 
confidence essential to new investment at reasonable interest rates, especially where 
control is left in the hands of unqualified managements.” 
 10. See Meckling, supra note 9, at 33. 
 11. See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Solving Creditor Problems in the 
Twilight Zone: Superfluous Law and Inadequate Private Solutions, 34 INT’L REV. L. & 
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In chapter 11, under federal law, the absolute priority rule only 
comes into play at plan confirmation, and then only when the plan is 
rejected by some class.12 It seems strange that a rule that might never be 
invoked, in a bankruptcy that might never happen, could have a big role 
in credit pricing. Moreover, by the time the rule appears at the end of a 
chapter 11 case, it has already been breached so often that its entrance 
no longer matters.13 Indeed, sensible corporate reorganization requires 
frequent departures from absolute priority.14 
There are several difficulties with the debt pricing argument—and 
whether shareholders might want to incur this extra cost is never 
considered15—but this paper focuses on two more basic problems with 
it. First, there is no absolute priority rule of the kind described in the 
literature under current law. It is not clear that there ever has been such a 
rule. 16  And even if there were, adopting such a rule would be 
																																																																																																																																
ECON. 61, 65 (2013) (“The agency problems that crop up in the implicit contract 
between shareholders and debt holders include well-known strategies such as claim 
dilution, extraordinary dividends and risk shifting or overinvestment. These strategies 
lower the value of the debt, and may result in a wealth transfer from creditors if 
unanticipated ex ante.”). 
 12. Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the 
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1229 (2003) (“[T]he 
absolute priority rule has . . . been criticized in the reorganization context as being none 
of those three things (absolute, about priority, or a rule).”). 
 13. As explained below, the rule is often breached in connection with (a) new 
financing, (b) “first day” motions, and (c) assumption of executory contracts and leases, 
among other things. It might also be breached as part of a court approved settlement 
agreement. 
 14. This was once understood. See Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, 
Bankruptcy and Reorganization: A Survey of Changes. III, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 398, 408 
(1938) (“The absolute theory of priority . . . is entirely unrealistic in the reorganization 
of a large company.”). 
 15. The basic form of the argument also assumes that all borrowers pay for the cost 
of priority violations, suggesting that lenders cannot predict which borrowers might 
default. That assumption is debatable for obvious reasons. 
 16. E.g., Walter J. Blum, The “New Directions” for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (1954) (“In railroad bankruptcy 
reorganizations the ICC and the Supreme Court both have talked in terms of adhering to 
absolute priority, but the approved plans contain allocations that give senior security 
holders substantially less compensation than called for by absolute priority in the 
classical sense.”); Note, Absolute Priority Under Chapter X—A Rule of Law or a 
Familiar Quotation?, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 909 (1952) (“A detailed analysis of 
approved plans, however, compels the conclusion that the rule has not always been 
applied with the same degree of consistency that its ritualistic incantation by the lower 
	
584 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
inconsistent with chapter 11, or any other sensible system of 
reorganization. 17 That is, chapter 11 will not work under the kind of 
rigid absolute priority rule many academic commentators promote, and 
thus the rule would be certainly flouted. 
The claim that the rule does not exist will take many by surprise. 
But consider the basic fact that there is no state law forum in which to 
vindicate the rule,18 and under chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code, the rule only applies when there is a contested plan.19 
The concepts behind the rule inform many state laws, like 
prohibitions on fraudulent transfers and restrictions on dividend 
payments,20 but the rule itself is absent from any direct application in 
state corporate debt collection law.21 Secured creditors worry about the 
priority of their liens relative to other secured creditors, and creditors of 
all sorts worry about the debtor leaking assets. But absolute priority is 
only relevant when a firm’s entire capital structure becomes due and 
payable at a single instant. That does not happen under state law. 
Instead, state law is primarily focused on providing a mechanism 
whereby unsecured creditors can obtain a judgment, and thus become 
secured creditors. Once creditors undergo that transformation, the issue 
of priority is determined by the order in which the creditor obtained its 
																																																																																																																																
federal courts and the SEC would seem to indicate . . . .”). Even in chapter 7, the rule 
only applies after a series of congressionally mandated deviations in the form of claims 
granted priority status. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2012). 
 17. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation 
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1950-52 (2006). 
 18. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the 
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 893 (2014) (“Some 
critiques of Chapter 11, and their attendant formulations of the baseline distribution to 
secured creditors, proceed from an unduly romanticized account of creditors’ rights 
under state law.”). 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). It is also important to remember that the “rule” only 
applies in chapter 11 cases, whereas each year thousands of business cases file under 
chapter 13. See, e.g., U.S. Courts, Table F-2—Bankruptcy Filings (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/bankruptcy-filings/2015/12/31 
[http://perma.cc/WP7H-4QC7]. 
 20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160(a)(1), 170(a), 281(a) (2016). 
 21. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1609-10 (2008). 
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lien.22 Thus, while the absolute priority rule focuses on the entire capital 
structure, priority under state law has no such concern because all 
creditors eventually become secured creditors by force of law if they 
seek payment. 
Otherwise creditors are paid as a business matter by the debtor in 
the ordinary course of its operations, in which case the debtor pays 
irrespective of priority.23 Indeed, the debtor’s business decision to pay a 
particular creditor most likely turns on questions of creditors’ relative 
importance to the debtor’s ongoing operations, with little regard for 
strict legal rights. The academic conception of the absolute priority rule 
in corporate reorganization is based on a world that does not exist. 
Reorganizing companies are dynamic things, whereas most of the 
literature assumes a frozen pool of assets, to which the court might 
oversee an orderly allocation of value. Reorganization in reality is 
fundamentally inconsistent with heartfelt fondness for a strict absolute 
priority rule. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE 
The absolute priority rule as a bankruptcy term dates back to a 1928 
article by Bonbright and Bergerman,24 although references to the idea in 
other, related contexts long predate that article. 25  Bonbright and 
																																																																																																																																
 22. Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for 
Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEX. L. REV. 11, 16 (1997). 
 23. Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 
974-75 (1981). 
 24. James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority 
Rights of Securities Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 
(1928); see Baird & Bernstein, supra note 17, at 1936. 
 25. See, e.g., The Cash Moratorium Negotiations, 1922 WORLD PEACE FOUND. 
PAMPHLET SERIES 98, 111 (“Of this sum 50,000,000,000 was to have absolute priority, 
carrying interest at 5% and sinking fund at 2% from August 1, amortizing in 25 
years.”); A. R. Butterworth, Australasia, 4 J. SOC. COMP. LEGIS. (n.s.) 250, 269 (1902) 
(“The advances are to be secured by mortgage with absolute priority over all other 
claims . . . .”); Frederick Thomas White et al., A Selection of Leading Cases in Equity, 
with Notes, 71 LAW LIBR. xxi, 131 (1851) (“By the Irish Act, 6 Anne, c. 2, an absolute 
priority is expressly given to the instruments first registered.”); see also In re Sauthoff, 
21 F. Cas. 542, 543 (W.D. Wis. 1877) (No. 12,380) (discussing partnership creditors 
and the “jingle rule,” which provides that “in equity, partnership creditors have an 
absolute priority of claim upon the partnership property for the payment of their 
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Bergerman coined the phrase to describe one possible bankruptcy rule, 
which the Supreme Court had occasionally seemed to endorse in 
corporate reorganization cases going back to the middle Nineteenth 
Century.26  
During the first of the reorganization cases pertaining to Rock 
Island Railroad in 1869,27 the Supreme Court struck down the sale of the 
railroad where about 16% of the sale consideration went to 
shareholders.28 Invoking the now (largely) forgotten corporate trust fund 
doctrine,29 the Court explained that: 
Regarded as the trustee of the corporate fund, the corporation 
is bound to administer the same in good faith for the benefit of 
creditors and stockholders, and all others interested in its pecuniary 
affairs, and any one receiving any portion of the fund by voluntary 
transfer, or without consideration, may be compelled to account to 
those for whose use the fund is held. Creditors are preferred to 
stockholders on account of the peculiar trust in their favor, and 
because the latter, as constituent members of the corporate body, are 
regarded as sustaining, in that aspect, the same relation to the former 
as that sustained by the corporation.30 
																																																																																																																																
demands, and that the interest of each individual partner is his share of the surplus after 
payment of the partnership debts.”). 
 26. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
 27. The company also went into bankruptcy (or, more precisely, a receivership) in 
1914. It went bankrupt again in 1933, and yet again in 1975. 
 28. See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus 
Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 72 (1986). 
 29. The trust fund doctrine originated in Wood v. Dummer, if not earlier. Wood v. 
Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944). There, a bank issued 
dividends of its capital stock to the bank’s shareholders. Then, the bank’s noteholders 
sued to be paid by the recipients of the dividends. The court reasoned that “the charters 
of our banks make the capital stock a trust fund for the payment of all the debts of the 
corporation.” Id. at 436; see also Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 
384 (1893) (“The property of a corporation is doubtless a trust fund for the payment of 
its debts, in the sense that when the corporation is lawfully dissolved, and all its 
business wound up, or when it is insolvent, all its creditors are entitled, in equity, to 
have their debts paid out of the corporate property before any distribution thereof 
among the stockholders.”). 
 30. See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392, 410 
(1868). 
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Rather than the “absolute priority rule,” this basic idea was known 
as the rule of Boyd, after Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd.31 That case 
was really a kind of successor liability or fraudulent transfer case, which 
held that a reorganized debtor was liable for the claims of a creditor who 
was entirely unpaid in the prior reorganization. 32  The basis for the 
successor liability—that the old shareholders had continued in the new 
firm without paying adequate value for those assets, while the 
complaining unsecured creditors were left out in the cold—was what 
made the case relevant to priority rule discussion. Into the 1920s, the 
Court continually proclaimed: 
if the bondholder wishes to foreclose and exclude inferior 
lienholders, or general unsecured creditors and stockholders, he may 
do so; but a foreclosure which attempts to preserve any interest or 
right of the mortgagor in the property after the sale must necessarily 
secure and preserve the prior rights of general creditors thereof. This 
is based upon the familiar rule that the stockholder’s interest in the 
property is subordinate to the rights of creditors, first of secured and 
then of unsecured creditors. And any arrangement of the parties by 
which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are 
attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either 
class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.” Louisville 
Trust Co. v. Louisville Railway Co., 174 U. S. 683, 684. 
This doctrine is the ‘fixed principle’ according to which [Boyd] 
declares the character of reorganization agreements must be 
determined, and to it there should be rigid adherence.33 
However, neither Kansas City Terminal nor the Bonbright and 
Bergerman article directly addressed the absolute priority rule. Instead, 
Bonbright and Bergerman were addressing the “significant unanimity of 
agreement that a court has not only the power but the duty to pass upon 
the fairness of the reorganization plan.” 34  Priority was an issue 
																																																																																																																																
 31. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
 32. See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 79 (1991); Note, The Effect of a Sale Under a 
Consent Decree as a Step in Corporate Reorganization, 27 HARV. L. REV. 467, 468 
(1914); see also Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and 
Equitable Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 
86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 41-45 (2012). 
 33. Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445, 
454 (1926). 
 34. Bonbright & Bergerman supra note 24, at 127. 
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subsumed within fairness. The question was which rule of priority 
applied when determining fairness. 
There were also exceptions to the rule of Boyd, particularly with 
regard to the generation of post-bankruptcy funding under what is today 
known as the “new value” exception to the absolute priority rule.35 For 
example, even the Court in Kansas City Terminal, after proclaiming 
“rigid adherence” to the rule of Boyd, noted that that case “does not 
require the impossible, and make it necessary always to pay unsecured 
creditors in cash before stockholders may retain any interest whatever in 
the reorganized company.”36 Initially many practitioners thought that 
Boyd would be a “nightmare,”37 but ultimately found that reorganization 
courts were willing to bless a plan’s fairness in situations that did not 
involve strict application of what Bonbright and Bergerman termed the 
absolute priority rule.38 
Bonbright and Bergerman themselves ultimately concluded that 
“[t]he old doctrine of absolute priority is probably not well adapted to 
the corporate form of organization, and its place may properly be taken 
by a modified form of the doctrine of relative position.”39 This new term 
coined by Bonbright and Bergerman for an old concept initially had 
little success, and did not appear again in the literature for almost seven 
																																																																																																																																
 35. See Bonner Mall P’ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. (In re Bonner Mall 
P’ship), 2 F.3d 899, 907-17 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Henry J. Friendly, Some 
Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 39, 75-76 (1934) 
(“Stockholders who furnish new money required by the reorganized company may be 
permitted to retain an interest in the company, even though sacrifices from creditors are 
compelled.”). 
 36. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 271 U.S. at 454. 
 37. James N. Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 
523, 526 (1917). 
 38. Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of 
the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 907-15 (1927); see also Philip M. Payne, 
Fair and Equitable Plans of Corporate Reorganization, 20 VA. L. REV. 37, 61 (1933) 
(“[T]o understand the meaning of the terms ‘fair and equitable’, as applied to corporate 
reorganizations, requires considerable background.”). 
 39. Bonbright & Bergerman supra note 24, at 165. 
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years, until its use in a 1935 student note.40 By this point corporate 
reorganization was codified and federalized.41 
In 1933, Congress had added section 77 to the 1898 Bankruptcy 
Act.42 This section changed prior law by permitting railroads to enter 
bankruptcy, and also codified existing receivership practices, including 
the rule of Boyd that courts could only approve reorganization plans that 
were “fair”—the full phrase that we know, “fair and equitable,” was yet 
to be used, although Congress did include the full term in a somewhat 
different context in a composition provision enacted as part of the same 
bill.43 Six days later, Congress actually used the full “fair and equitable” 
term when it passed the Bank Conservation Act. Section 207 of the 
statute allowed for the reorganization of depository banks—this was still 
before FDIC insurance—provided that the terms of the reorganization 
were “fair and equitable.”44 This was the first deployment of the term in 
the bankruptcy context. 
In May 1934, when extending bankruptcy relief to municipalities, 
Congress used the full “fair and equitable” phrase again.45 And in June 
of that year, section 77B was added to the Bankruptcy Act to allow for 
general corporate reorganization, and that also required plans to be “fair 
and equitable.”46 Then, just over a year later, section 77(e) was officially 
amended to include the full “fair and equitable” term with regard to 
railroads.47 Section 77B was then replaced in 1938’s Chandler Act48 
with new chapter X, which was to be the primary reorganization 
																																																																																																																																
 40. Note, The “Fair” Plan in Corporate Reorganization: II, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
549, 555 (1935). 
 41. For a nice, concise overview of the receivership process and the codification of 
corporate reorganization, see Warner Fuller, The Background and Techniques of Equity 
and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations—A Survey, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 
(1940). 
 42. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467. See, in particular, section 77(g). 
 43. See id. at 1470 (“[T]he court, on such notice and on such terms, if any, as it 
deems fair and equitable, may enjoin secured creditors who may be affected by the 
extension proposal from proceeding in any court for the enforcement of their claims 
until the extension has been confirmed or denied by the court.”). 
 44. Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, tit. II, § 207, 48 Stat. 1, 3-4. 
 45. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, § 80(e), 48 Stat. 798, 801-02. 
 46. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912-22. 
 47. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat. 911, 918-20. 
 48. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 897 (1938). 
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provision for publicly traded firms.49 The legislative history provided 
that “[s]ubsection (2) of section 221, derived from section 77B(f)(1), 
provides, as a condition to confirmation of a plan, that the judge be 
satisfied that it is ‘fair and equitable,’ and ‘feasible.’”50 In 1935, the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act also provided for reorganization of 
utilities under a “fair and equitable” standard.51 
In 1939, railroads that were afflicted by the Great Depression were 
offered “expeditious relief” under chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act.52 
This too required reorganizations be “fair and equitable.”53 
Then, in late 1939, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice 
Douglas in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., handed down its 
first decision actually interpreting the phrase “fair and equitable” in a 
case arising under the by then repealed section 77B.54 Douglas had just 
joined the Court that year, after a career as both an academic and an 
important member of the SEC staff, ultimately serving as its third 
chairman.55 In his years with the SEC, he had been actively involved 
with the drafting of a multi-volume report 56  in which the agency 
criticized the equity receivership system for favoring insiders at the 
expense of small bondholders. 57  This report not only prompted the 
Chandler Act, but also the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, which made it 
																																																																																																																																
 49. See generally Reuben G. Hunt, The Proper Use of the Chapters X, XI and XII 
of the Bankruptcy Act, 44 COMM. L.J. 72 (1939). 
 50. See S. REP. NO. 75-1916, at 35-36 (1938). As discussed below, and unlike 
modern practice, under former chapter X, a plan had to be “fair and equitable” in order 
to be confirmed whether or not it was accepted by the requisite majorities of each class. 
See also H.R. Res. 8046, 75th Cong. § 221 (1938). 
 51. See Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, § 11, 49 Stat. 803, 820-23. 
 52. See Act of July 28, 1939, ch. 393, 53 Stat. 1134; see also Hubert L. Will, 
Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act—An American Adaptation of the Fait Accompli, 7 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 203 (1940). This is not to be confused with the current chapter 15, added 
to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005. 
 53. See In re Baltimore & O.R. Co., 29 F. Supp. 608, 628 (D. Md. 1939). 
 54. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
 55. Justice Brandeis retired February 13, 1939; Justice Douglas was confirmed as 
his successor on April 4, 1939. 
 56. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND 
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE 
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937–1940). 
 57. J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of 
Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. REV. 540, 542–44 (1973). 
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quite difficult to reorganize bond debt outside of a federal bankruptcy 
proceeding.58 Justice Douglas personally lobbied his colleagues to grant 
certiorari in Los Angeles Lumber59 presumably to advance the work he 
had started with the SEC. 
In that case, holders of more than 92% of the debtor’s bonds along 
with more than 99% of Class A stock and about 90% of Class B 
stockholders approved the debtor’s reorganization plan. But the plan 
provided for bondholders to be transformed into preferred shareholders, 
and Class A shareholders to become the new common shareholders.60 In 
short, Class A shareholders would retain their interest in the company in 
a situation where everyone would have otherwise agreed that the 
bondholders were not being paid in full. Justice Douglas wrote that 
the phrase [“fair and equitable”] became a term of art used to 
indicate that a plan of reorganization fulfilled the necessary 
standards of fairness. Thus throughout the cases in this earlier 
chapter of reorganization law, we find the words “equitable and 
fair”, “fair and equitable”, “fairly and equitably treated”, “adequate 
and equitable”, “just, fair, and equitable” and like phrases used to 
include the “fixed principle” of the Boyd case, its antecedents and its 
successors. Hence we conclude, as have other courts, that that 
doctrine is firmly imbedded in [section] 77B.61 
The question, he said, was whether the debtor’s plan was fair. He 
concluded it was not because the bondholders “will be required under 
the plan to surrender to the stockholders 23 per cent of the value of the 
enterprise.”62 Suggesting that “fair and equitable” had become “term of 
art” in the railroad receivership community probably exaggerated things 
more than a bit.63 
Nonetheless, Los Angeles Lumber indicated that the Supreme Court 
agreed with the SEC’s inclination to read the term “fair and equitable” 
																																																																																																																																
 58. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 422 
(1972). 
 59. KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 378–79 (2008). 
 60. Class B shareholders were eliminated. 
 61. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118-19 (1939) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 62. Id. at 119. 
 63. In the words of Jack Ayer: “Strictly speaking, this is poppycock, and Justice 
Douglas knew it.” John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 963, 975 (1989); see also De Forest Billyou, “New Directions”: A Further 
Comment, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1380–81 (1954). 
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to include something like the absolute priority concept that Bonbright 
and Bergerman had described just over a decade before.64 But when all 
was said and done, the absolute priority rule still lacked the basic 
features its name would suggest. Even Justice Douglas seemed to 
recognize as much65—and he notably never used the term himself.66 As 
Robert Swaine summarized after several further Supreme Court forays 
into corporate reorganization, 
Thus the fullness of the compensation or payment, the making 
whole, the application of the full value of the property, the absolute 
and strict recognition of priority, all seem to be positional or 
comparative—i.e., relative. Even in respect of relative positions in 
assets and earnings the words “absolute” and “strict” are to be taken 
in a much less “absolute” or “strict” sense than they might seem to 
imply. A senior securityholder may be given treatment in the same 
class of securities as is allotted to junior creditors provided the terms 
of the allotment to the senior creditors are sufficiently more 
favorable. This is evidenced not only by the actual treatment of the 
securities approved in the two cases but also by express language in 
both opinions.67 
Everyone apparently agreed that reorganization plans must be fair 
and equitable. After Boyd, this clearly prohibited freezing out entire 
classes of creditors when junior claimants, like shareholders, survived. 
But there was no definitive adoption of the “absolute priority rule” in its 
																																																																																																																																
 64. See Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate 
Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1346 
n.55 (1939) (“The S. E. C. is committed to a ‘strict priority’ view of reorganization 
draftsmanship.”). 
 65. See L.A. Lumber, 308 U.S. at 121 (“It is, of course, clear that there are 
circumstances under which stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization of 
an insolvent debtor.”) 
 66. The “Fair and Equitable” Rule in Modern Corporate Reorganization, 25 IOWA 
L. REV. 793, 799–800 (1940) (“[T]here is the possibility that the Supreme Court, in 
deciding a case involving a more difficult situation than that involved in the Los 
Angeles case, may distinguish that case on its facts and follow a rule more akin to the 
relative priorities rule. . . . [T]he Los Angeles case did not adopt the absolute priority 
rule by name and . . . neither the Los Angeles . . . nor the Boyd, Louisville Trust 
Company, or Kansas Terminal Railway Company cases on their facts called for the use 
of the rule.”). 
 67. Robert T. Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of 
the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1208–09 (1943). 
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strict liquidation sense. Justice Douglas had successfully nudged the 
concept of “fair and equitable” closer to Bonbright and Bergerman’s 
absolute priority rule, but that was a more practical creature than the 
“strict priority schedule” that modern authors talk about today.68 
For the remaining years of the Bankruptcy Act, until 1978, the 
absolute priority rule, as defined in Los Angeles Lumber, remained the 
rule in chapter X.69 And while it was often argued that cases involving 
publicly traded securities should be transferred to chapter X, the courts 
continued to allow companies to file under chapter XI in many 
situations.70 That was highly significant because Congress eliminated 
the “fair and equitable” rule from chapter XI in 1952.71   
In short, the rule of Los Angeles Lumber applied in a limited 
number of cases, namely those that were compelled to file under chapter 
X, which was increasingly seen as something of a moribund chapter, 
and the occasional railroad under section 77.72 And when it did apply, it 
was seen as a bother. 73  In particular, senior classes were unable to 
consent to deviations from the rule, so valuation fights were required in 
every case. In the late 1960s, the SEC suggested that the “fair and 
equitable” rule be modified.74 In the early 1970s, the Commission on the 
																																																																																																																																
 68. See Chauncey H. Hand, Jr. & G. Clark Cummings, Consensual Securities 
Modification, 63 HARV. L. REV. 957, 976 (1950); Note, Strict Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganization, 49 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103 (1940). 
 69. In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, Justice Douglas made it plain 
that the absolute priority rule applied to chapter X too. Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. 
DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). 
 70. See, e.g., Beach v. KDI Corp. (In re KDI Corp.), 477 F.2d 726, 737 (6th Cir. 
1973); In re Arlan’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. 373 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also 
Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securities 
Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920, 958-62 (1964). Chapter XI involved a debtor in 
possession, while chapter X required a trustee in all cases with debts over $250,000. 
Chapter XI only reorganized unsecured debt, and did not allow for involuntary filings. 
For a concise comparison of the two, see William J. Rochelle, Rehabilitation in 
Bankruptcy: A Comparison of Chapters X and XI, 34 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 17 (1965). 
 71. See Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433; Ayer, supra note 63, 
at 976–78. 
 72. Although the biggest case of this era, Penn Central’s 1970 filing, was under 
section 77, from the early 1950s, when the last of the post-war cases were completed, 
until the 1970s, there were very few major railroad bankruptcy cases. See Wyatt R. 
Haskell, Railroad Reorganization for Beginners, 24 ALA. L. REV. 295 (1972). 
 73. See Marilyn Huff, The Defrauded Investor in Chapter X Reorganizations: 
Absolute Priority v. Rule 10b-5, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 215 (1976). 
 74. See Rochelle, supra note 70, at 19. 
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Bankruptcy Laws of the United States “both proclaim[ed] its attachment 
to the absolute priority rule and propose[ed] effectively to abolish the 
rule.”75 There was a general sense that the rule was impractical. As 
Blum and Kaplan summarized: 
In a sense, the absolute priority doctrine does prescribe a general 
rule: before a class of investors can participate in a reorganization, 
all more senior classes must be compensated in full for their claims, 
measured on the basis of their priorities upon involuntary 
liquidation, unless the junior class contributes to the reorganized 
enterprise something that is reasonably compensatory and is 
measurable. Reorganizers have always understood, however, that 
this general formulation does not dictate a specific pattern of 
adjusting rights among classes of investors. Reorganization plans are 
the result of a process in which representatives of the investors 
“negotiate” (indirectly and sometimes directly) with each other . . . .76 
Other commentators argued that liquidation value of the debtor 
should provide the value protected by the absolute priority rule—that is, 
the rule would not entitle senior creditors to going concern surplus.77 
While the Commission’s proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973 was not to 
be, 78  it had real influence on the discussions that led to the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code.79 As Congress noted, times had changed, and the rule 
that once protected small investors as bondholders now hurt them as 
shareholders.80   
The Bankruptcy Code made several key changes to the absolute 
priority rule. First, the rule now only applies to dissenting classes—that 
																																																																																																																																
 75. Victor Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission’s Proposed “Modifications” of 
the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 308 (1974). 
 76. Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in 
Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 652-53 (1974). 
 77. John H. Frye, III, The Fair and Equitable Doctrine: Are Liquidation Rights a 
Realistic Standard During Corporate Reorganization?, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 394, 421-
22 (1970). This argument had much older roots. See, e.g., Spaeth & Winks, supra note 
9, at 772 (discussing, but not endorsing, the “composition” theory of section 77 in an 
article published before the Los Angeles Lumber decision). 
 78. See S. 2565, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong. (1973). 
 79. See generally Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy 
Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941 (1979). 
 80. See 124 CONG. REC. 34,004 (1978); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. 
Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 133 (1990). 
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is, classes can waive the rule, and minority positions within the class are 
bound by the result. Moreover, classes that are unimpaired under the 
plan are automatically deemed to consent.81 Thus, in consensual plans, 
or even partially or “deemed” consensual plans, the holdout problem is 
solved and the absolute priority rule abolished. When there is a 
dissenting class, the cramdown option permits the confirmation of a plan 
notwithstanding the objection, if the plan is “fair and equitable, with 
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and 
has not accepted, the plan.”82 Section 1129(b)(2)(A) goes on to specify 
certain standards to be used for ascertaining whether a given plan is “fair 
and equitable” with respect to a class. 
For unsecured creditors and equity-holders, the absolute priority 
rule continues to apply, and thus either the dissenting class must be paid 
in full or no junior class can be paid under the plan.83 In the case of a 
class of unsecured creditors, this means full payment or no equity 
participation. While in early cases there were sometimes attempts to 
preserve at least some “option value” for the old shareholders, the 
modern trend seems to favor cancellation of equity, whereas the debtor 
avoids the tricky question of whether the creditors have actually been 
paid in full.84 
After 1978, the absolute priority rule no longer applied to secured 
creditors,85 but section 1129(b) does protect a dissenting secured class 
by providing that it must receive the full value of its collateral, either as 
a claim or by sale of the collateral and distribution of the proceeds to the 
dissenting class. 86  That is, a class of secured creditors must either 
																																																																																																																																
 81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2012). 
 82. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 83. For a concise overview of how this operates in practice, see SALLY MCDONALD 
HENRY, ORDIN ON CONTESTING CONFIRMATION § 12.03[D] (2015), Westlaw ORDNCC. 
 84. Of course, shareholders might eventually argue that the creditors are being 
overcompensated, as the “fair and equitable” rule protects interests beyond the absolute 
priority rule. See generally Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 
(1990). 
 85. See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of 
Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 82 (1991). 
 86. Lynn M. LoPucki et al., Optimizing English and American Security Interests, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1837 (2013). As Walter Blum noted, this calculation 
could actually become quite complex. Walter J. Blum, The “Fair and Equitable” 
Standard for Confirming Reorganizations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 165, 169–71 (1980). 
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consent, as in the recent Chrysler case,87 or be paid full value of their 
collateral. Paying full value protects the same kind of interests as the 
absolute priority rule, while other classes are entitled to insist on a plan 
that complies with the absolute priority rule. This only comes into play 
when voting on a plan, and on its confirmation by the court. The Code 
may allow the debtor to distribute assets before this point in the case. 
Doing so may allow certain creditors, namely those who provide greater 
long-term value to the debtor, to obtain treatment that deviates from the 
“strict priority schedule” that some imagine applies under the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
For example, if a debtor assumes a useful contract during the 
course of its bankruptcy case, section 365 requires the debtor to cure any 
pre-bankruptcy defaults. 88  Moreover, the debtor must continue to 
perform on the contract going forward. Section 365 thus allows the 
debtor to elevate certain contractual creditors into a special status, 
beyond mere creditor.89 Instead, these lucky counterparties are excused 
from the bankruptcy process and resume normal, contractual relations 
with the debtor firm.  
Of similar import—if somewhat vaguer statutory authority—are 
payments made under “first day” motions. 90  Providers of important 
inputs become “critical vendors,” and customers with prepetition 
warranty claims are paid “in the ordinary course,” in both cases 
effectively exempting them from the bankruptcy process. 91  Some of 
																																																																																																																																
 87. See Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 271, 277 (2012). Assuming the absolute priority rule is applicable in a 
section 363 sale, it is often said that Chrysler involves a violation of the rule. See, e.g., 
Macey & Beirne, supra note 7, at 2–3. But that typically either forgets that the rule 
applies on a class basis or involves some sort of elaborate conspiracy theory as to why 
consent should not matter in the case. In essence, these commentators would like to 
return to pre-1978 law, where consent was not permissible and the rule applied on an 
individual creditor basis, but amusingly they would do so to protect sophisticated 
distressed debt investors, rather than Justice Douglas’ small bondholders. 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2012). 
 89. Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special 
Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61, 66 (2009) (“The debtor’s election essentially 
decides whether the contract will be treated as an asset or a claim.”). 
 90. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 574 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 91. Richard E. Mikels & Ella Shenhav, Chrysler Reflects Modern Reorganization 
Practice, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2011, at 38, 82. 
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these suppliers might be bound by contract, but nonetheless claim that 
the debtor’s bankruptcy warrants non-performance or a change in the 
terms of performance. Of course this is a breach, but if no other supplier 
can step in and do the job, it may be optimal for the debtor to give in to 
these demands to some degree.  
 Another common first day motion allows the debtor to pay 
employees in the ordinary course. Thus, while employees normally have 
a priority over other unsecured creditors, 92  they effectively obtain a 
priority over secured creditors as well when paid under a first day 
motion. If a debtor is to continue as a going concern—the basic 
difference between liquidation and reorganization—these sorts of 
priority “violations” may be inevitable, and even desirable.93 
A debtor in litigation with a counterparty might enter into a 
settlement, and that settlement might ultimately provide a greater 
recovery than the creditor-counterparty would have received if the 
debtor was liquidated. 94  Other counterparties have a right to extract 
assets from the debtor’s estate at less than full value. For example, it has 
been widely noted that swaps and other derivatives are largely exempt 
from the bankruptcy process.95 If the debtor is “in the money” on a 
particular contract, its non-bankrupt counterparty obtains a right to 
terminate the contract, and pay the debtor damages according to a 
calculation process the non-bankrupt party largely controls. Not 
surprisingly, there have been claims that this has resulted in loss of 
																																																																																																																																
 92. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4). 
 93. See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Essential Corporate Bankruptcy 
Law, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39, 52-53 (2015). 
 94. See Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium 
Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 460 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Czyzeweski v. Jevic 
Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), No. 08–11006(BLS), 2014 WL 268613, at 
*3 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014) (“As discussed by the bankruptcy court, the settlement does 
not follow the absolute priority rule. However, this is not a bar to the approval of the 
settlement as it is not a reorganization plan.”), aff’d sub nom. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 
173 (3d Cir. 2015) (In affirming the district court’s holding, the Third Circuit noted that 
“neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever said that the rule applies to 
settlements in bankruptcy.”). But see United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, 
Inc.), 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 95. Stephen J. Lubben, Transaction Simplicity, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 194, 
198 (2012). 
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value for the debtor’s estate.96 That lost value presumably could have 
resulted in higher recoveries for creditors. 
In short, the current law is that the absolute priority rule applies 
only if a class objects to the plan, and only at the point of plan’s 
consideration. The debtor-firm’s assets at the end-point of the case are 
subject to the rule, but those assets might have been significantly 
reshaped before that point.97 Moreover, that reshaping may have allowed 
substantial deviations from the absolute priority rule that would have 
governed on the day the bankruptcy case commenced. 
In this way, the current bankruptcy process resembles that of the 
old railroad receivership process, which the Chandler Act sought to end. 
In a receivership, numerous intermediate claimants were paid in full 
through specialized doctrines like the six-month rule98 and the doctrine 
of necessity.99 Those general creditors who remained after application of 
these rules were the ones protected by the rule of Boyd. Nonetheless, 
this practical version of the absolute priority or the rule of Boyd, which 
has developed over a century, is not the one that features prominently in 
the academic literature, a point I turn to next. 
II. THE ACADEMIC VIEW OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE 
Although scholarship about the absolute priority rule, or the Boyd 
or Los Angles Lumber rules, dates back almost a century, the bulk of this 
work, until relatively recently, was particularly practical.100 Even Walter 
																																																																																																																																
 96. Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 123, 129–32 (2010). 
 97. Del. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings, LLC (In re Energy Future 
Holding Corp.), 527 B.R. 157, 166 (D. Del. 2015) (“Plans of reorganization are not the 
exclusive mechanism to exchange debt or pay off existing creditors in chapter 11.”). 
 98. Upheld in Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1878); see also In re Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1234, 1319-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
 99. See In re Boston & Maine Corp., 468 F. Supp. 996, 1008 (D. Mass. 1979). The 
doctrine of necessity, also know as the necessity of payment rule, dates back to 
Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W.R. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311–12 (1882). See also 
Tina M. Sutorius, Are Certain Creditors Too Big (or Important) to Fail?, 6 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 263, 270–73 (2011). 
 100. Judge Mabey collects this literature in In re Barrington Oaks General 
Partnership. In re Barrington Oaks Gen. P’ship, 15 B.R. 952, 958 n.17 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1981) (noting that “[t]he literature analyzing the rule and advocating its modification is 
immense” and citing many articles therein). 
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Blum’s papers, often pointed to as the origin of most modern 
scholarship in this area,101 have a kind of practical bent that deviates 
from modern scholarship,102 where the goal was not to provide a theory 
of the rule, but rather to explain how the rule worked in practice. Three 
(relatively) recent papers by professors Ayer, 103  Markell, 104  and 
Warren 105  fit easily within this literature, and also provide some 
modicum of broad theory as well. 
Ayer finds constitutional and common law strands of the absolute 
priority rule in the course of expressing some skepticism about the new 
value exception to the rule.106 Markell reviews the historical evolution of 
the rule from its successor liability roots to show how the so-called new 
value exception has always been part of the rule.107 On the other hand, 
Warren justifies the absolute priority rule in the separateness of the 
bankruptcy estate from the debtor’s old owner, before acknowledging 
that questions of valuation are the main intractable problem in all 
bankruptcy theories.108 
The full modern academic treatment of the rule does not really 
commence until 1988, with the publication of Baird and Jackson’s 
Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority 
Rule. 109  The article was in many ways a follow-up to their prior 
individual work that had questioned the utility of chapter 11, given a 
conspicuously rosy view of chapter 7.110 
In short, Baird and Jackson argue that bankruptcy law would be 
well served by focusing on the residual claimant in the debtor’s capital 
																																																																																																																																
 101. See Lipson, supra note 12, at 1229 n.180; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas 
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988). 
 102. E.g., Walter J. Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate 
Reorganization: A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1958). 
 103. Ayer, supra note 63. 
 104. Markell, supra note 32. 
 105. Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9 
(1992). 
 106. Ayer, supra note 63. 
 107. See Markell, supra note 32, at 101. 
 108. See Warren, supra note 105, at 14 (“Two factors contribute to the difficulty of 
reaching the best value for the reorganizing business: the thinness of the market for the 
business, and the possibility for self-dealing by the manager charged with selling the 
business.”). 
 109. See Baird & Jackson supra note 101. 
 110. See id. at 741 n.10. 
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structure.111 As such, they suggest that the absolute priority rule, or the 
rule of Boyd as they refer to it, should be discarded in place of rules that 
better increase that focus.112 For example, if an intermediate class is the 
residual claimant, they argue that such a class is better protected by 
reinstating the senior creditors under section 1124(2), and taking 
ownership of the debtor-firm from the junior shareholders.113 With the 
benefit of hindsight, this focus on reinstatement seems odd, primarily 
because it happens so infrequently in actual practice. When the Code 
was first enacted in 1978, interest rates were quite high and debtors had 
some strong incentives to maintain old debt that has been issued under 
comparatively low rates. Since the 1990s, however, interest rates have 
been sufficiently low that debtors have had few reasons to reinstate very 
much debt.114  
In general, while expressing some skepticism over the role of the 
absolute priority rule, Baird and Jackson put extra stress on the equally 
vexing issue of valuation. Yet, while the authors differ from their peers 
in calling for something other than the use of the rule, they are similar to 
those who followed in focusing on the single case in which the rule 
applies. 
These attempts at thoughtful, theoretical understandings of the 
absolute priority rule were then buttressed by a wealth of proposals to 
replace chapter 11 with a market-type automated system.115 As part of 
this approach, the proponents of the new system inevitably argued that 
																																																																																																																																
 111. Id. at 766 (“[W]e show that once one can identify the residual owner of the 
firm, the ordinary rule that the residual owner should be able to bargain on behalf of the 
firm should hold inside of bankruptcy as it does outside.”); see also id. at 775. 
 112. The purpose of this section of the paper is to develop the academic 
understanding of the absolute priority rule, not to critique the various key papers. 
Nonetheless, the Baird and Jackson proposal does obviously suffer from the near 
impossibility of identifying a single, stable residual claimant. See generally Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341 
(2004). One might also observe that the firms they utilize in their hypotheticals look 
more like small businesses than the big corporate debtors they purport to address, and 
the unity between shareholders and management they propose seems implausible. See 
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 80, at 149–51. 
 113. See Baird & Jackson supra note 101, at 765. 
 114. For a rare recent example of an attempt at reinstatement under section 1124(2), 
see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC (In re Charter 
Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 243–45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 115. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. 
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the new approach would facilitate payment of creditors “by strict 
application of the absolute priority rule.”116 More broadly, the general 
trend was to promote systems of “reorganization” that would quickly 
convert the debtor’s estate into a pool of cash. 117  This avoided the 
difficulty that inevitably arose from the application of a strict form 
absolute priority rule outside of a chapter 7-style liquidation—going 
concern valuation being always subject to debate. 118  Typically left 
unstated was why this strictness would be a good thing.119 
As noted, the rule was not particularly strict even during its days 
under the old Act.120 The new value exception, acknowledged by Justice 
Douglas himself, clearly opens the door to a form of bargaining unlike 
the prototypical sheriff’s sale.121 Section 1129(b) itself does not state the 
rigor with which the rule is to be applied. Somehow commentators 
assume that the invocation of the rule means the invocation of their 
preferred form of the rule: “a use of abstract words as if they had 
absolute meanings.”122 
More generally, as noted earlier, the application of a strict absolute 
priority rule at the point of plan confirmation seems somewhat odd 
given the well-known practices that allow deviations from priority for 
																																																																																																																																
 116. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1085 (1992). 
 117. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (proposing that claimants and interest holders be given 
tradable options in the reorganized entity); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New 
Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983) (proposing an all-
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 118. See Yaad Rotem & Omer Dekel, The Bankruptcy Auction as a Game – 
Designing an Optimal Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 REV. LITIGATION 323, 343 (2013). 
 119. But not always, for example in Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution 
Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83, 88 (2001) (the 
assumption that managers and shareholders share unitary interests leads to the 
conclusion that “for the managers, anticipation of a soft landing in the event of 
insolvency would reduce the discipline debt can impose and thus could make failure 
more likely.”). 
 120. See Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority, and the Pricing of Risky 
Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 272 (1977). 
 121. See Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 161, 195 (1999). 
 122. Raymond Chandler, The Simple Art of Murder, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
(December 1944). 
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various practical reasons before confirmation. 123  Strict application at 
confirmation seems little more than rigor for rigor’s sake, at a point 
when the barn door has been open far too long. And as I argue in the 
next and final section, the desire to apply “strict” priority in a 
reorganization case is seriously misguided. Reorganization is not 
liquidation. It requires different rules. More broadly, a review of the 
academic literature of the post-1978 era suggests an excessive focus on 
the absolute priority rule at a single, static point in time. This is 
understandable, because doing so isolates the rule from the equally 
challenging question of valuation.124 
The debtor is not static outside the liquidation when continuing as a 
going concern. Instead, an operating firm remains a dynamic organism, 
with constantly changing asset and debt values. 
III. PRIORITY AND REORGANIZATION 
Priority rules make the most sense when applied to a specified pool 
of assets, better yet, a pool of cash—hence the temptation to focus on 
plan confirmation in reorganization cases. But operating businesses are 
not static pools of assets, or pools of a single kind of asset, and applying 
a priority rule at confirmation is greatly influenced by what happened 
the day before the confirmation hearing. Strict priority requires knowing 
what is owed and what the debtor owns. The question of when those two 
should be measured cannot be divorced from the application of the 
priority rule if the debtor is to continue in existence. The possible 
methods of distributing value in an insolvency case lay on a continuum: 
at one end is the “strict priority schedule” or extreme liquidation form of 
the absolute priority rule, and at the other might be some sort of random 
distribution of assets. In the second, the debtor’s assets might be handed 
out by lottery amongst all the claimants.  
In the first, assets would be distributed by the absolute priority rule 
alone, without even the deviations long allowed for employee claims or 
other similar priority claims such as currently listed in section 507 of the 
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Code.125 That pole is unobtainable in reality, because no system could 
function without paying for the costs of its operation.126 But it is possible 
to imagine a kind of pure chapter 7 with section 507(a)(2) and no other 
forms of priorities. 
The other extreme flattens the capital structure: why accept a lower 
return on bonds if your recovery upon insolvency will be 
indistinguishable from that of equity? Here we would see real evidence 
of the ex ante effects that loom so large in the academic literature.127  
In the United States, and most other developed economies, 
liquidation proceeds under a modified form of the absolute priority rule. 
The effects of the basic rule are mitigated for specific favored creditors 
who either receive the benefit of a priority in payment, or an exception 
from the discharge that typically results from the process.128  This is 
sufficiently close to the strict form of the rule to avoid untoward effects, 
and even if such effects did exist, there has been an implicit policy 
judgment that the social benefits outweigh the costs. 
The trouble begins with the attempts to duplicate this rule in the 
reorganization context. Historically, the rule simply informed the 
broader fairness analysis. That is, under the receivership cases from the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the question was “is this plan 
fair?” The normal rules of liquidation provide some insight into that 
otherwise abstract question.  
But as noted, the courts also found that the question of fairness was 
broader than the simple issue of priority. 129  Pure squeeze-outs of 
intermediate classes might be prohibited, but otherwise the question 
focused on the reasonableness of the plan. Thus, more than a decade 
after Boyd was decided by the Supreme Court, Bonbright and 
Bergerman could still note the variety of priority rules at play in 
reorganization cases. 130  Feeling the lower courts too generous to 
reorganization proponents, Justice Douglas, no doubt still influenced by 
his SEC perspective on the matter, arrested the meaning of “fair and 
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equitable” in Los Angeles Lumber. However paradoxical, the Supreme 
Court effectively “codified” the meaning of “fair and equitable.” Then, 
in the 1970s when Congress wanted to relax Los Angeles Lumber, it had 
no choice but to actually codify the absolute priority rule. 
But this codification should not have made the rule any more 
strident than under Los Angeles Lumber. Indeed, given the clear desire 
to relax the rule as announced in that case, it is arguable that Congress 
intended something more like the Boyd era version of the rule.131 Of 
course, regardless of congressional intent, many commentators would 
seem to favor a strict form of absolute priority.132 That, however, is the 
result of the obsessive focus on the endpoint, without regard for the 
duration of the process. Moreover, the fixation on the point of 
distribution allows commentators to ignore the basic paradox inherent in 
this interaction of contract and reorganization law. While credible, 
enforceable commitments are a good thing ex ante, unbending 
enforcement of those same agreements ex post results in value 
destruction.133 Ex ante rigidity comes into conflict with the need for ex 
post flexibility. 
As a general matter, a debtor-firm cannot compel counterparties to 
trade during a reorganization case. Thus, operating while under 
bankruptcy court protection involves the normal contractual process, 
with the added challenge that the debtor must bargain from a position of 
weakness. Given this reality, one way that the debtor can bargain is by 
offering to pay beyond what liquidation priorities would provide. Future 
dealing becomes tied to recoveries on past dealings. Investors, however, 
do not benefit from ongoing trading relationships with debtor-firms, and 
thus have little ability to engage in this sort of bargaining. Instead, 
employees, trade creditors, and the like benefit most. Investors benefit 
only indirectly, inasmuch as the debtor-firm is apt to be worth more, and 
thus pay more to creditors generally, if it keeps operating. 
 The bondholder faces a choice between the relatively certain return 
of liquidation and the potentially higher return of a reorganization case, 
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but the latter involves conferring benefits on other creditors who have 
more “soft” power with regard to the debtor.134 Of course, in reality an 
individual bondholder does not get to make this choice, as the choice is 
made by a jurisdiction’s insolvency law.135 And in the United States, the 
choice has been made to favor reorganization whenever feasible. 
Whether that choice is good, or wise, has been the subject of much 
academic commentary, to put it mildly.136 In general, this debate has 
been about as fruitful as the Somme Offensive. 
But this paper need not participate in that engagement. The point 
here simply is that, having chosen a reorganization system, it is 
impossible to make that system work while also adhering to strict 
liquidation priorities. The two are inherently in conflict. 
Operating companies pay creditors according to business needs, 
without regard for actual priority. The hedge fund that holds tens of 
millions in senior notes, issued under an indenture replete with 
covenants, is in this sense subordinate to the trade creditor who provides 
$100,000 of some vital input each week. The senior noteholders are only 
relevant every six months—when interest payments are due—and at 
maturity. The trade creditor is relevant with each invoice.  
The relationship is little different in chapter 11. The hedge fund has 
strong rights at the confirmation hearing, but if the debtor-firm is to 
make it to the confirmation hearing as a going concern, the trade 
creditor must be kept happy. One of the easiest ways to keep them 
happy is to pay them regardless of their formal rights under the “strict 
priority schedule.” Easy, but could the trade creditor be handled some 
other way, perhaps more in line with the absolute priority rule? 
Presumably a single trade creditor could be managed, albeit with 
some cost. Replacing a trusted vendor always involves some degree of 
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disruption to a business, and the new trade creditor in this instance is in 
a good position to extract extra returns from the debtor-firm. But a strict 
absolute priority firm would never apply to just one creditor; it must 
apply to all creditors. Here we begin to see the inherent incompatibility. 
The operation of the debtor as a going concern is fundamentally at odds 
with the notion of the debtor renegotiating with all of its trade creditors 
upon bankruptcy, and then renegotiating with all of its employees too. 
Application of a strict priority rule throughout reorganization essentially 
requires the firm’s management to recreate the firm upon insolvency, at 
a point when the firm’s lack of bargaining power is apt to increase the 
costs of doing so. The benefits of reorganization would be lost, raising 
real questions about any attempt to reorganize whatsoever. In short, 
reorganization simply cannot exist with such a strong form of the rule. 
The strict form of the absolute priority rule, so favored by the 
academy, is thus nowhere to be found in actual reorganization practice. 
CONCLUSION 
That the absolute priority rule is both more flexible and less 
absolute than often asserted does leave us in a bit of a conundrum. 
Namely, a flexible form of the rule leaves open the question of when 
that flexibility should be exercised.137 Flexibility in the furtherance of 
preserving going concern value generally seems laudable, while 
flexibility in service of undercompensating disfavored creditors is 
properly loathed. 
The solitary benefit of the imaginary form of absolute priority rule 
is ease of application—at the expense of reorganization, however. A 
messy reality means that difficult choices of when liquidation priority 
should be broken need to be specified and understood. Recognizing the 
true nature of the absolute priority rule makes clear the work that 
remains to be done. 
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